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Will Pay for Performance Be Worth the Price to
Medical Providers?
A Look at Pay for Performance and Its Legal
Implications for Providers
Stacy L. Cook, J.D., LL.M*
"There's a price to pay if you want to make things better, a price to pay just for leaving
things as they are, a price for everything." - Harry Browne

I. INTRODUCTION

Quality is the new mantra of healthcare payors. While quality is a longstanding theme in the healthcare industry, tying compensation to results has
been a new focus in health care.1 The pay for performance concept
represents the latest strategy developed by healthcare payors to control costs
while improving quality. 2 Simply stated, pay for performance (P4P) is an
incentive program that measures several defined aspects of a provider's care
and compensates the provider according to the performance achieved.3
The turn to quality or performance as related to reimbursement is a
natural progression given society's changing perspective of the healthcare
system. Traditionally, medicine was not considered a typical commodity
because quality could not be easily measured. The practice of medicine
was considered more of an art than a science and was a localized and
* Stacy L. Cook received an LL.M. in Health Law in May 2006 from Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. Ms. Cook is an associate in the Healthcare Department of Barnes &
Thornburg LLP in Indianapolis. She previously served as Litigation Counsel for the Kansas
Board of Healing Arts and received her J.D. from Washburn University School of Law in
Kansas in 1993.
1. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based
Compensationfor Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1427, 1472 (2001).
2. See Sally Trude, et al., Health Plan Pay-for-Performance Strategies, 12 AM. J.
MANAGED CARE 537 (2006) (noting that health plans investing in P4P programs uniformly
sought to reduce costs through better quality and efficiency).
3. AHRQ RESOURCES ON PAY FOR PERFORMANCE (P4P), http://www.ahrq.gov/
QUAL/pay4per.htm#toc (last visited September 27, 2006).
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individualized profession.4 Today, health care is generally viewed from a
national, and sometimes even global, perspective. Consumers' ability to
compare services provided across geographic regions affects the concept of
quality. For example, in 2003, Medicare studied regional differences for
hospital services involving hip fractures, colorectal cancer, and acute
myocardial infarction.5 While Medicare found that hospitals in higher
spending areas provided sixty percent more care than hospitals in lower
spending areas, 6 there was no significant difference in the quality of care
provided.7 Technology and consumerism have also prompted the spread of
information and education to consumers and payors. In addition, science
has evolved to allow a more standardized approach in evaluating and
treating disease.8 The emergence of these factors has consequently put
quality and performance in the spotlight.
This article considers the legal implications of P4P programs mainly
from the perspective of healthcare providers. 9 Although P4P programs
vary, most share four common attributes: (1) adherence to clinical
guidelines; (2) collection of data from the healthcare provider; (3)
measurement of the provider's performance; and (4) acknowledgement of
the provider's performance with recognition and pay. All of these
components of P4P will affect the practice of medicine in many ways, and
this article examines the likely effects that P4P programs will have on
provider liability and rights.
Part II begins by explaining how P4P programs have emerged. Part III
explains the structure and operation of these programs. Part IV then details
the potential legal effects of P4P, including managed care liability, provider
termination rights, and the discovery and admissibility of clinical guidelines
and information collected in the performance programs. The goal of this
4.

See

JOHNS

HOPKINS

MEDICINE,

THE

FOUR

FOUNDING

PHYSICIANS,

http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/about/history/history5.html (noting Dr. Osler's role as one
of the four founding physicians of The Johns Hopkins School of Medicine); Amy Jurevic
Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in Medicine, 23 J. LEGAL
MED. 449, 475-76 (2002) (illustrating that the standard of care was previously defined within

a local community. Now practitioners are generally held to a national standard of care).
5. Medicare Physician Payment: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109 th Cong. 28 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on Medicare
Physician Payments] (testimony of Mark B. McClellan, CMS Administrator), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/testimony.asp?Counter- 1730.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Carter L. Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical
Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 479, 510-11 (2004).
9. The use of the term "provider" in this article includes physicians and hospitals, the
two major participants in P4P programs.
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article is to shed some light on P4P programs and to anticipate their
influences so that providers and their counsel can intelligently evaluate
participation in specific programs. Additionally, this article demonstrates
that if providers participate in the evolution of P4P, they may be able to
minimize the more detrimental consequences and take advantage of the
potential legal effects that might benefit providers, such as additional peer
review protection.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE PROGRAMS
In recent years, the number of P4P programs has increased dramatically.
According to Med-Vantage, a California health informatics company, as of
February 2006 there were approximately one hundred fifteen P4P
programs.' ° Three years earlier, only thirty-five such programs existed."
These programs have emerged largely as the result of employer, health
plan, and government initiatives.
A. Employer-Based Initiatives
P4P really gained momentum with the organization of employers.
Indeed, no discussion of the genesis of P4P would be complete without
mention of the Bridges to Excellence (BTE) program and the Leapfrog
Group. These organizations have played a leading role in the development
of performance programs. 12
Bridges to Excellence is a multi-state program initiated by employers.
Some of the current employer-participants include General Electric, UPS,
and Procter & Gamble.' 3 In addition to employers, other participants
include the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), various
health plans, and WebMD Health. 14 BTE was formed in response to the
Institute of Medicine's 2001 report, "Crossing the Quality Chasm,"' 15 and in
particular the report's recommendation to redesign reimbursement in order

10.
11.
12.

Lisa Girion, Ratings to Affect Doctors' Wallets, L.A. TIMES, February 6, 2006.
Id.
See Michael J. Pentecost, MD, Pay-for-Performance: At Last or Alas?, THE
PERMANENTE
JOURNAL,
Volume
10,
No.1,
Spring
2006, available at
http://xnet.kp.org/permanentejournal/spring06/perfornance.html (discussing the roles of The
Leapfrog Group and BTE in the emergence of P4P).
13.
BRIDGES To EXCELLENCE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: BTE OVERVIEW,
http://www.bridgestoexcellence.org/bte/faqs.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
14. BRIDGES TO EXCELLENCE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: BTE OVERVIEW, supra
note 13.
15. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW
HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY (National Academy Press 2001).
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to effectuate quality improvement. The three key principles that guide BTE
are as follows:
"
•
"

Reengineering care processes to reduce mistakes will require
investments, for which purchasers should create incentives;
Significant reductions in defects (misuse, underuse, overuse) will
reduce the waste and inefficiencies in the health care system; and
Increased accountability and quality improvements will be
encouraged by the release of comparative provider6 performance
data, delivered to consumers in a compelling way.'

In general, participating employers pay bonuses to physicians for program
compliance. Currently, BTE consists of three programs: Physician Office
Link, Diabetes Care Link, and Cardiac Care Link. 17 For example,
physicians who participate in the Diabetes Care Link program can receive
up to an eighty-dollar bonus per year for each diabetic patient. 18 Some of
the payors that have participated in BTE include Humana,
UnitedHealthcare, and Anthem.' 9
The Leapfrog Group was officially formed in 2000 after a group of large
employers expressed an interest in influencing the quality and affordability
of health care.2 ° One of the Leapfrog Group's stated missions is to promote
"high-value health care through incentives and rewards." 2' In 2005, it
initiated a nationally-standardized rewards program for participating
hospitals. 22
The program focuses on measuring effectiveness and
affordability in five clinical areas: acute myocardial infarction (acute MI);
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG); percutaneous coronary intervention;
pneumonia; and deliveries.2 3 Hospitals that demonstrate excellence or show
improvement are rewarded in the form of bonus payments, higher
reimbursement rates, and public recognition.24
16. BRIDGES TO EXCELLENCE, OVERVIEW,
http://www.bridgestoexcellence.org/bte/
aboutus/home.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Scott Endsley et al., Getting Rewards for Your Results: Pay-for-Performance
Programs,J. FAM. PRAC. MGMT Mar. 1, 2004, at 4.
20. THE
LEAPFROG
GROUP,
How
AND
WHY
LEAPFROG
STARTED,
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/about-us/how-and-why (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
21.

THE

LEAPFROG

GROUP,

THE

LEAPFROG

GROUP

FACT

SHEET,

http://www.leapfroggroup.org/about-us/leapfrog-factsheet (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
22. Id.
23. THE
LEAPFROG
GROUP,
LEAPFROG
HOSPITAL
REWARDS
PROGRAM,
https://leapfrog.medstat.com/hrp/index.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
24. Id.
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B. Health Plans
Health plans have also implemented individualized incentive programs.2 5
For example, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, a non-profit HMO in the
northeast, implemented an incentive program during negotiations for rate
increases.2 6 The subsequently enacted rate increase included a portion that
evaluated performance in specific areas, including adult diabetes, pediatric
asthma, and inpatient utilization.2 7 In this program, providers receive the
full amount of withheld funds if they demonstrate improved performance.
Similarly, in California, multiple health plans have collaborated with a
statewide initiative known as Integrated Healthcare Association (IHA) to
establish a P4P program. 28 IHA was formed in July of 2000 by health plan
medical directors, physician group executives, and purchasers who realized
that even though there was much discussion about "value-based
purchasing," few programs were actually implemented. 29 The IHA P4P
program was unveiled on January 15, 2002, with six plans participating:
Aetna, Blue Cross, Blue Shield, CIGNA, Health Net, and PacifiCare Health
Systems.3 ° Performance measurements began in 2003, and the first
payments based on those measurements were made one year later. 31 For
example, in 2004, PacifiCare Health Systems awarded bonuses in the
32
amount of fourteen million dollars to 124 out of 130 of its medical groups.
C. Medicare
Pay for performance may be catapulted into the industry if implemented
by Medicare.
For approximately two years, the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission ("MedPAC") has been analyzing P4P by studying
private P4P programs and testing various programs through demonstration
projects, such as the Physician Group Practice demonstration. 33 Ten large
25.
See generally THE LEAPFROG GROUP, PROFILES OF ORGANIZATION USING QUALITY
INCENTIVES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.leapfroggroup.org/RewardingResults/pdf/

profiles.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28.

INTEGRATED

HEALTHCARE

ASSOCIATION,

INITIATIVE

HISTORY,

http://www.iha.org/payfprfd.htm
HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION,

(last visited Sept. 15, 2006). See also INTEGRATED
INITIATIVE OVERVIEW, http://www.iha.org/P4POVIEW.htm (last

visited Sept. 15, 2006).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Martin Sipkoff, Will Pay for Performance Programs Introduce a New Set of
Problems?,
MANAGED
CARE
MAG.,
May
2004,
available
at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0405/0405.hazards.html.
33. Hearingon Medicare PhysicianPayments, supra note 5.
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physician groups from different communities across the country are
participating in the Physician Group Practice project.34 Reimbursement in
that program is based on fee for service, but participants may also earn
performance bonuses.35
Another project, the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration,
helps to determine whether providing financial incentives to hospitals will
improve patient outcomes and reduce costs. 36 Participation is voluntary and

hospitals can receive bonuses in Medicare payments based upon
performance of certain quality measures. 37 Conversely, hospitals that do
not perform well will be financially penalized in the third year of the
project. 38
On July 27, 2005, MedPAC revealed its position on P4P when the
Executive Director of MedPAC testified before the United States Senate
Finance Committee. 39 At the beginning of his testimony he stated:
MedPAC has concluded that Medicare is ready to implement pay for
performance as a national program and that differentiating among
providers based on quality is an important first step towards
purchasing the best care for beneficiaries and assuring the future of the
program. 40
Furthermore, MedPAC recommends that Medicare adopt P4P programs for
hospitals, physicians, home health agencies, Medicare Advantage plans,
dialysis facilities, and physicians who treat dialysis patients.41
With respect to physicians, MedPAC recommends implementation of
P4P in two stages. 42 During the first stage, physicians will be encouraged
to adopt information technology (IT) and will be required to report whether
they have certain IT capabilities. 43 Medicare will include the actual use of
IT as a quality outcome measurement and will reward outcome
achievement.4 4 The second stage, which would occur two or three years
later, will involve measuring the clinical process of care for certain health
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

th
Payfor Performance in Medicare: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109

Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Mark E. Miller, Ph.D, Executive Director, Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission).
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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conditions.4 5 MedPAC recommends that Medicare include all specialties
within the P4P programs.46
MedPAC recommends that the P4P program should reward providers for
exceeding certain benchmarks, as well as for making improvements in care.
The purpose of this approach is to encourage low-scoring providers to
improve care.4 7 As a funding recommendation, Medicare should set aside a
small share of payments and take a budget-neutral approach.48 MedPAC
recommends that Medicare start with one to two percent of current provider
payments, since that would be the least disruptive for providers and
beneficiaries.
The amount should increase as providers gain more
experience with P4P.49
As the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) waited for
Congressional approval of the proposed P4P Medicare programs, it
implemented a voluntary performance-reporting program. The Physician
Voluntary Reporting Program (PVRP), which started on January 3, 2006, is
essentially a simple P4P program without the payment incentive. 50 Under
PVRP, physicians may report certain patient care data to CMS.51 That data
will then be analyzed to measure physician performance. 52 Currently,
neither the participation in the program nor the physician's performance
53
results will affect reimbursement.
At first, CMS proposed the use of thirty-six performance measures under
PVRP, but after receiving concerns from physician groups it reduced the
number of initial performance measures to sixteen. 54 Physicians in any
specialty can participate in the program. CMS reports that it will analyze
and measure each physician's performance and will provide physicians with

45.

Payfor Performancein Medicare,supra note 39, at 2.

46.

See id. at 6 (noting that CMS has already started collaborating with the American

College of Surgeons,

Society of Thoracic Surgeons, and other specialty groups to

implement quality measures).
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id.
50. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PHYSICIAN VOLUNTARY
REPORTING
PROGRAM
OVERVIEW,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PVRP/01 _Overview.asp
[hereinafter PHYSICIAN VOLUNTARY REPORTING PROGRAM] (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. CMS Takes AAFP Advice on Physician Voluntary Reporting Program, AAFP NEWS
Now, January 13, 2006, available at http://www.aafp.org/x41175.xml. See also CENTERS
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PHYSICIAN VOLUNTARY REPORTING PROGRAM, supra

note 50.
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feedback regarding the results.55 CMS estimates that feedback will be
available to physicians as early as summer 2006.56

III. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE SPECIFICS

Not all P4P programs are the same. The most important distinctions
include how performance is measured, who sponsors the program, the level
of provider involvement, and how providers are compensated for quality or
performance.57
A. How P4PProgramsAre Commonly Structured
Even though P4P programs vary, most can be categorized into a few
common models.5 8 In the first model, employers pay individual doctors for
achieving performance measures or improving performance. The BTE
program is an example of this model in which physicians earn a bonus for
each patient. The payments are usually true bonuses and have the potential
to change behavior. The second model is similar, but involves a group of
health plans that coordinates bonus payments to individual physicians for
improved performance measures.5 9 IHA is an example of this model. In
the third model, single health plans or Medicare may reward individual
physicians for performance. These programs are likely to be limited with
respect to the conditions covered by the performance plan, which usually
translates to smaller rewards for doctors. 60 Additionally, the Harvard
Pilgrim Health Care plan withholds funds rather than giving physicians a

55.
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PHYSICIAN VOLUNTARY REPORTING
PROGRAM FACT SHEET 3 (October 28, 2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/
press/release.asp?Counter=1701 [hereinafter MEDICARE FACT SHEET] (last visited Sept. 15,

2006).
56. Id.
57. Examining Pay-for-Performance Measures and Other Trends in EmployerSponsored Health Care: HearingBefore the H. Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations
of the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 109 th Cong. 4 (2005) (testimony of
Meredith B. Rosenthal, Ph.D, Assistant Professor of Health Economics and Policy, Harvard
School of Public Health), available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr-doc/Rosenthal testimony_
05-17-2005.pdf.
58. Thomas Bodenheimer, et al., Can Money Buy Quality? Physician Response to Pay
for Performance, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, Issue Brief No. 102,
December 2005, at 1, available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/807/.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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true bonus.6 1

In that program, if physicians do not meet performance

62
measures, they will not experience the negotiated rate increase.

Furthermore, the American Medical Association (AMA) and many

physicians have voiced concerns that some P4P programs are nothing more
than disguised withholding programs that managed care previously
implemented to limit care.63 According to Kevin Grumbach, M.D., a

physician with the Primary Care Research Center of the University of
California, there is a significant difference between these two schemes:
We've found that bonuses based on the limitations of referrals and on
productivity heighten physician performance anxiety and their
perceptions that care may be compromised in these areas. Incentive
programs based on meeting quality measures and improving patient
satisfaction 64are associated with significantly higher physician job
satisfaction.
Thus, the AMA has developed a set of five principles to address physician
concerns such as payment. The principles are meant to be used as a guide

in designing P4P programs and are summarized as follows:
*

Ensure Quality of Care-Use evidence-based measures created by
physicians and allow for variations based on sound clinical
judgment;

*

Foster the Patient-Physician Relationship-Fair programs should

support the relationship and recognize some obstacles such as
the patient's financial circumstances and compliance;
*

Participation Should Be Voluntary-The programs should not
adversely affect physicians who choose not to participate;

61.
DELAWARE HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION GLOSSARY OF HEATH CARE TERMS AND
ACRONYMS, http://www.deha.org/Glossary/GlossaryW.htm#top (defining a withhold fund

as: "The portion of the monthly capitation payment to physicians withheld by the managed
care plan until the end of the year or other time period to create an incentive for efficient
care. If the physician exceeds utilization norms for other members of his group or
geographic region, he or she loses the fund or part of it. The principal of the withhold fund
may be applied to hospital services, specialty referrals, laboratory usage, etc.").
62. Id.
63. Martin Sipkoff, Is Pay for Performance Part of the Cure or the Problem?,
MANAGED CARE MAG., July 2005, (observing that one major issue for physicians in a P4P
program is where the "performance money" is coming from. In some programs funds are
just redistributed. Employer-sponsored programs and programs supported by grants are
more likely to provide additional funds). See also Bodenheimer, supra note 58, at 1.
64. Bodenheimer, supra note 58, at 3.
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Use Accurate Data and Fair Reporting-Physicians should be
allowed to review, comment and appeal the results; and
Incentives Should Be Fair-New funds should be provided for
positive incentives.6 5

The final P4P model involves individual health plans or Medicare paying
performance bonuses to physician organizations instead of to individual
physicians.66 The organization may distribute the bonuses to its members,
67
or it may use the bonuses to invest in IT or quality improvements.
Other programs have also been disguised as P4P. Probably the most
infamous is the United HealthCare Performance program, implemented in
the St. Louis area in 2005. In this program, United HealthCare identified
providers who had achieved quality and cost control.68 These providers
were designated as "star" providers. 69 Enrollees who sought services from
70
non-star providers had to pay significant out-of-pocket expenses.
Physicians and health systems had no input in the program and no warning
prior to its implementation. 7'
Claims data from 2002 and 2003 helped in the development of the
United HealthCare Performance program. 72 Some quality measurements
existed, but the star rating was largely based on costs. 73 Originally, only

twenty-six percent of Illinois physicians and twenty-seven percent of
Missouri physicians in the network received a star rating.74 Shortly after the
program began, the area's largest healthcare system gave notice that it

65. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS - AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNAL MEDICINE,
ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL PHYSICIAN PERFORMANCE BY MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 1,

available at http://www.acponline.org/hpp/indpp.pdf.
ASSOCIATION,

PRINCIPLES

FOR

PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE

See also AMERICAN MEDICAL
PROGRAMS,

http://www.ama-

assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/-l/finalpfpprinciples.pdf (promulgating nine principles for
the development and implementation of P4P programs) [hereinafter P4P PRINCIPLES] (last
visited Sept. 15, 2006).
66. Bodenheimer, supra note 58, at 1.
67. Id.
68. Judith VandeWater, BJC Warns it May Drop United Healthcare, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, March 18, 2005 (noting that General Motors and UPS used the plan while
DaimlerChrysler Corporation planned to switch its hourly employees to this plan).
69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

74.

VandeWater, supra note 68.
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would terminate its contract with United HealthCare.75 Several months
later the parties announced that they reached an agreement regarding the
Performance program.76 The parties did not disclose the specifics of the
agreement.
If bonus payments are a defining P4P characteristic, then many Medicare
programs will probably not meet the definition in the long run. The stated
purpose of the Medicare P4P program is to pay less for substandard
services.7 In order to do this, the Medicare performance program will
differentiate among providers. "Pay for performance will ... address an
inequity in the current system: paying the provider who gives his patients
better care the same as the provider who does not.",7 8 Medicare plans to
implement the program without any additional costs, which means that the
payments to higher performing providers will come out of the pockets of
the lower performing providers.
The amount of the payment incentive may also be a major factor in the
Medicare program. In its proposal to the Senate Finance Committee,
MedPAC recommends initial payments of only one to two percent of
current payments. 79 The Director of MedPAC acknowledged that concerns
have already been raised regarding the insufficiency of the planned
payments. In order to participate in P4P, providers will be burdened with
extra costs of technology and labor. The performance payments may not be
worth these costs to providers, and it has been noted that the primary effect
of P4P will be to harm low-performing providers and discourage Medicare
participation.80 MedPAC does not do much to alleviate these concerns,
continually stressing that the purpose of P4P is to differentiate among
providers.8 ' Some are concerned that the real goal of P4P programs like the
Medicare proposal is not to encourage providers to achieve higher goals,
but to eliminate the lower performing providers.8 2
The AMA has been critical of the Medicare P4P program and the
Medicare PVRP. On November 7, 2005, the AMA voted to oppose
Medicare P4P initiatives that do not comport with AMA principles and

75. Id.
76. Patrick L. Thimanqu, BJC, UnitedHealthCare Reach Agreement, ST. Louis
BusiNEss JOURNAL, June 23, 2005.
77. Payfor Performance in Medicare,supra note 39, at 1.
78. Id. at9.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id.at 1.
81. Id.at 9.
82. See id.But cf Girion, supra note 10 (describing a plan to increase performancebased pay).
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guidelines. 83 Additionally, the AMA voted to oppose PVRP prior to its
implementation. 4 One of its main concerns with PVRP is the manner in
which physicians report data.85 Physicians who participate in the program
must report patient care information through the use of so-called "GCodes," which are meant to be a temporary reporting mechanism until
physicians are able to submit data through electronic health records.8 6 The
G-Codes do not replace other billing and diagnostic codes that are already
required, but will instead be used in addition to those codes.87 The AMA is
concerned that the use of G-Codes for reporting data will significantly
burden some physicians, especially when they report data for patients with
multiple problems.88 Moreover, private insurers and other P4P programs do
not use G-Codes. 89 The AMA is also concerned that the program will
become mandatory and that there will90 be a correlation between performance
data and future reimbursement rates.
B. What Is Measured In A P4PProgram
According to the National Committee for Quality Assurance, most P4P
programs measure performance in both clinical and non-clinical areas. 91
Patient satisfaction constitutes a common P4P performance measure that
falls outside of the clinical realm.9 2 Additionally, many programs use
information technology as the primary non-clinical measure. An adequate
IT structure is required for efficient collection and reporting of relevant
measurement criteria. P4P programs may evaluate whether physicians have

83. Press Release, American Medical Association, AMA Issues Policies on Medicare
Pay-for-Performance (November 7, 2005); available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/15729.html.
84.

Jennifer Lubell, AMA Opposes Medicare Physician Voluntary Reporting Program,

OB/GYN
NEWS, Dec.
15,
2005,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/
p/articles/mi_mOCYD/is_24_40/ai_n16001053/print.
85. Id.
86. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PHYSICIAN VOLUNTARY REPORTING
PROGRAM FACT SHEET 3, supra note 55, at 2.
87. Id.
88. Lubell, supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, HEDIS®--HEALTH PLAN
EMPLOYER DATA AND INFORMATION SET, http://www.ncqa.org/communications/publications/
hedispub.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). Many P4P programs follow or incorporate
HEDIS®. According to NCQA, more than ninety percent of managed care organizations use
this set of standardized measures to determine and compare plan performance.
92. See, e.g., PACIFIC BUSINESS GROUP ON HEALTH, 2005 SCORING GUIDELINES,
http://www.opa.ca.gov/reports/2005_ScoringGuidelines.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
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adequate IT infrastructures and whether they are actually being used.93
Since IT is an integral component of P4P, the cost of IT may be one of the
major obstacles to the widespread implementation of P4P programs. One
independent physician association in California reported that it paid
$150,000 for technology to track claims, lab results, and
prescriptions so
94
that it could report data in the IHA performance program.
Clinical measurements can be categorized as process-oriented or
outcome-oriented. 95 P4P programs may measure several aspects of the
process of care. For example, the programs may review whether a provider
uses a tracking system to remind patients to follow up on treatments, tests,
or medication reviews. 96 A program may also measure whether a provider
uses any tools, such as education or resources, to assist patients in
managing their own conditions.9 7 Programs typically measure whether all
patients with a certain disease are provided with specific medications or
diagnostic screenings. Finally, a major part of the process measurement is
whether providers follow clinical guidelines or evidence-based medicine for
98
certain conditions.
Most P4P programs also measure clinical outcomes. 99 For example, a
program may measure whether hypertension patients are within a range of
acceptable blood pressure levels. 100 This is probably the most controversial
aspect of performance measurement because outcomes are not entirely
within the provider's control. A patient's clinical outcome depends on
many factors unrelated to a provider's performance, and some may argue
that this measurement fails to consider those factors.
In 2004, several groups jointly proposed a set of basic standards for all
P4P plans. 10 ' Subsequently, the Ambulatory Care Quality Alliance,
American Academy of Family Physicians, American College of Physicians,
America's Health Insurance Plans, and Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality announced the final set of twenty-six standards in the spring of

93.
94.

Payfor Performance in Medicare, supra note 39, at 5.
Janet Colwell, Pay-for-Performance Takes Off in California, AM. C. PHYSICIANS
OBSERVER, Jan. 2005, available at http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/jan05/pfp.htm.
95. Pay for Performance in Medicare, supra note 39, at 2, 10 (describing Medicare's
approach to P4P as three-fold: structure, process and outcomes).
96. Id. at 5.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 5-6.
99. Girion, supra note 10.
100. Id.
101. Sipkoff, supra note 63, at 7.
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2005.102 These standards are a good example of a very basic set of P4P
standards and are summarized as follows:
Preventative Measures
* Breast cancer screening
" Colorectal cancer screening
* Cervical cancer screening
* Tobacco use inquiry
* Advice to quit smoking
* Flu vaccine
" Pneumonia vaccine
Coronary Artery Disease
" Percentage of patients with coronary artery disease who were
prescribed lipid-lowering therapy
* Beta-blocker treatment immediately after MI
" Persistent beta-blocker treatment months after discharge
Heart Failure
* Certain patients who were prescribed ACE inhibitor or ARB
therapy
" Left ventricular failure assessment
Diabetes
* Perform one or more AIc tests
* Percentage of patients with most recent Alc level greater than
9.0% (poor control)
* Percentage of patients with blood pressure below 140/90
" Percentage of patients with at least one LDL test
" Percentage of patients with most recent LDL less than 100mg/dL
or 130 mg/dL
" Percentage of patients who received retinal or dilated eye exam
by specialist
Asthma
* Percentage of patients identified as having persistent asthma who
were prescribed medications
" Percentage of patients who were prescribed preferred long-term
control medication or acceptable alternative

102.

Id.
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Depression
* Percentage
who were
medication
* Percentage
months

of adults diagnosed with a new episode of depression
treated with an antidepressant and remained on
during eighty-four day acute treatment phase
of adults who remained on antidepressant for six

Prenatal Care
* Percentage of patients screened for HIV during first or second
prenatal visit
* Percentage of Rh negative patients who received anti-D immune
globulin at twenty-six to thirty weeks
Quality Measures Addressing Overuse or Misuse
* Percentage of patients diagnosed with upper respiratory infection
and not given antibiotic within three days
an
* Percentage of patients diagnosed with pharyngytis, 0prescribed
3
antibiotic, and received group A streptococcus test'
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF P4P PROGRAMS
It is important not to lose sight of the basic structure and purpose of P4P
programs as the potential legal effects of such programs are reviewed. P4P
may influence managed care and provider liability. The influences may
occur directly or indirectly, such as through the use of discovery and the
type of evidence allowed at trial. It is also important for providers to be
cognizant of any potential rights they may have with respect to these
programs.
A. Liability ofHealth Plans and Managed Care Organizations
Health plans and managed care organizations (MCOs) have a
credentialing process for the selection and retention of providers.'0 4 MCOs
103.

Id. at 7-11.

104.

Jerry S. Sobelman, Managed Care Credentialingof Physicians,PHYSICIAN'S NEWS

http://www.physiciansnews.com/business/
available at
2001,
June
DIGEST,
601sobelman.html (observing that the process typically involves verification of the
following: (1) professional licensure; (2) controlled substance prescribing certificates from
the Drug Enforcement Administration and counterpart state agencies; (3) education; (4) postgraduate training; (5) hospital staff privileges; and (6) levels of liability insurance. In
addition, an on-site office visit might be required. Id. Some states have also enacted laws
that regulate managed care credentialing). See, e.g., IND. CODE §27-13-43-1,-2 (requiring
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have been found liable to enrollees for negligence in their selection and
retention process under various legal theories. One such theory is the
doctrine of corporate negligence, which was first established in Darlingv.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital.10 5 In Darling, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a hospital owes a duty of care to patients
independent of the physicians who practice within the hospital. 10 6 The
concerns raised in the Darlingcase included the hospital's failure to review
the particular physician's care and failure to require physicians to obtain
consultations in certain circumstances. 10 7 Today, the doctrine of corporate
negligence encompasses a hospital's responsibility to appropriately screen
applicants for privileges, select and retain only competent physicians,
oversee those who provide care within its walls,10and
implement policies and
8
rules for the delivery of quality care to patients.
The doctrine of corporate negligence has been extended at least in part to
MCOs. 109 In Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, the court ruled that the
corporate negligence doctrine, which was initially applied to hospitals,
should also be applied to MCOs because they play a role in the healthcare
industry that is similar to hospitals in many respects. 10 The court noted
that, like hospitals, MCOs are comprised of many individuals who work
together to arrange for and provide comprehensive healthcare services to
members. 111
Additionally, at least one court has imposed liability based upon another
legal theory. In McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization of
Pennsylvania, a thirty-nine year old female, who was enrolled in an
Independent Practice Association (IPA) Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO), presented to her designated primary care physician for the removal
of a mole. 112 Even though the patient informed the doctor that the mole had
recently changed significantly in size and color, the physician discarded the
HMOs to adopt the credentialing application form used by the Council for Affordable
Quality Healthcare).
105. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
106. Id. at 257-58.
107. Id. at 258.
108. See, e.g., Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981);
Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991). But see Lemuz v. Fieser, 933 P.2d
134 (Kan. 1997).
109. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. Of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000); Shannon v.
McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. 1992). See also Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, Application of the
Corporate Negligence Doctrine in Managed Care Organizations: Sound Public Policy or
Overkill?, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 585 (2001) (listing jurisdictions that have
applied the corporate negligence doctrine to managed care organizations).
110. 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 2000).
111. Id.
112. 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), ajfd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996).
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mole without obtaining a biopsy." 3 The patient died a few years later of
malignant melanoma. 114
The patient's family brought suit against the physician and HMO
alleging medical malpractice and misrepresentation." 5 The family argued
that the doctrine of corporate negligence should be applied to the HMO and
that it should be held liable for negligently selecting and retaining the
physician in its network. 1 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it
was not necessary to extend the corporate negligence doctrine to the IPA
HMO model for this claim because the court had previously adopted
Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for "liability regarding
services rendered." ' 1 7 The court held that the plaintiffs' claim could
proceed because they met the requirements of the Restatement by alleging
the following:
(1) That the HMO has undertaken to render services to the subscriber;
(2) Which the HMO should recognize as necessary to protect its
subscriber; (3) That the HMO failed to exercise reasonable care in
selecting, retaining, and/or evaluating the primary care physician; and (4)
That as a result118of the breach of care the risk of harm to the subscriber
was increased.
The court in McClellan also ruled that the plaintiffs could maintain a cause
of action against the HMO for misrepresentation." 19 The plaintiffs claimed
that the HMO made false and/or misleading statements when it stated that
every primary care physician in its
network was qualified and met the
120
criteria.
screening
stringent
HMO's
In addition to these theories of liability, some states have enacted statutes
that provide a cause of action against managed care organizations.121 While
the statutes may not specifically mention selection of physicians, they
usually impose a general duty of care that is broad enough to include an

113.

Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1054-55.
115. Id. at 1055.
116. Id. at 1058-59.
117. Id.at 1059.
118. McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization of Pennsylvania, 604 A.2d 1053
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996).
119. Id.at 1060.
120. Id. at 1060-61.
121. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-48; CAL. CrV. CODE § 3428. Cf.Aetna Health Inc.
v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (holding that negligence claims against HMO brought under
Texas statute were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).

114.
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argument for liability for negligent credentialing and oversight of
physicians. 122
Pay for performance programs will likely increase the risk of liability of
health plans and managed care organizations for selection and retention of
participating physicians. In order to implement P4P, health plans and
MCOs will compile and maintain significant data regarding each
physician's performance.
The data will also be compared to other
providers. Thus, at the very least, the data will make it easier for an
enrollee to evaluate an MCO's conduct with respect to its physicians. This
information may be used as direct evidence that an MCO had knowledge
that it should not have selected or retained a particular physician.
For example, if a physician fails to provide breast cancer screening for a
patient and the patient brings a claim against the MCO for negligent
credentialing, she may be able to obtain the performance data collected by
the MCO through discovery. This should tell the patient the percentage of
patients for which the physician has obtained breast cancer screenings and
how this percentage compares to other physicians. If the data show that the
physician repeatedly scored low as compared to others, then the patient has
direct evidence that the MCO had knowledge of the doctor's low
performance. In addition, if the MCO gave this physician a "star" or other
type of satisfactory rating or seal of approval, the patient may have another
claim for misrepresentation.
As MCOs will retain direct data on the quality of their physicians, they
may be forced into the difficult position of choosing whether to start
terminating low-performing providers or, alternatively, to subject
themselves to increased liability exposure. Since the goal of P4P is
supposedly to improve care and not to eliminate providers, it may be
beneficial for MCOs to establish timeframes for its physicians to meet
certain performance standards. This might create a balance between
protecting against liability and improving care.
B. PhysicianRights Regarding Report Cards and Plan Termination
If MCOs feel the pressure from increased liability exposure, they may
take more action to terminate physicians. Additionally, P4P participants
will receive performance scores or ratings that could significantly impact
reimbursement. The ratings will also be communicated to the public, which
might impact provider business. 123 This raises the question of whether
122. But cf ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-3153 (2005) (showing a very narrow statute
that does not include credentialing issues).
123. See, e.g., STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF THE PATIENT ADVOCATE, 2005 HMO
REPORT CARD, http://opa.ca.gov/reportcard/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2006) (showing a rating
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physicians have any rights to challenge termination decisions or
performance ratings. As noted previously, one of the AMA's major
concerns is that P4P programs should include the ability of physicians to
review and appeal ratings. 24 Legal rights to challenge terminations and
performance ratings can potentially be found in three different areas: the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution, 25 statutes, and contracts.
Due process is not required in all situations, so the first issue is whether a
physician actually has a due process right to challenge a performance rating
or termination from a health plan. If a due process right exists, then the
physician should be given notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be
heard and present evidence. 126 Several conditions must exist in order to
implicate due process rights. First, there must be some protected interest at
stake. 127 Generally, the due process guarantee does not apply unless there is
some attempt to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.12 8 The North
Dakota Supreme Court addressed this issue in North Dakota Commission
on Medical Competency v. Racek.129 In that case, the Commission on
Medical Competency (Commission) was investigating a physician. The
physician requested a temporary injunction, asking that the Commission
provide him with notice of all complaints against him and conduct a
confidential hearing before it filed a formal disciplinary complaint against
him. 130 The physician argued that the potential damage to his reputation
constituted a protected interest. 3 ' The court rejected this argument and
held that reputation is not a protected interest. 132 This case demonstrates
that physicians will likely be unsuccessful in arguing that there are due

system used in California).
P4P PRINCIPLES, supra note 65.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...").
126. See e.g, Willner v. Comm. on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 105 (1963)
(requiring both notice of grounds for bar application denial and a fair and full hearing on
grounds for denial for procedural due process); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)
(requiring right to notice and opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner for procedural due process while allowing for variance in the type of
hearing, depending upon the nature of the case and the importance of the interests involved).
127. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80-81.
128. See id.
129. 527 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1995).
130. Id. at 263. The Commission was investigating the doctor at this point. No legal
proceeding had yet been filed nor any attempt made by the Commission to impose
restrictions on the doctor's license.
131. Id. at 266-67.
132. Id. at 267.
124.
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process rights to review or in challenging performance ratings or report
cards. Moreover, while a bad report card may significantly affect a
physician's reputation and business, it does not affect a protected right.
Physicians may fare no better with respect to termination from a plan or
MCO. In Eye Clinic v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital, a group
of ophthalmologists and optometrists brought suit after they were denied
participation in a preferred provider organization ("PPO"). 133 The group
argued that they were denied due process because they were not given a
hearing or even an explanation for the denial.1 34 The Tennessee Court of
Appeals held that participation in the PPO was not a protected property
interest.135 The court explained that due process rights attach only when a
property interest is more than a "unilateral expectation" or "abstract need or
desire. 1 36 Further, the property interest must be "a 'legitimate claim of
entitlement' to137a specific benefit" to warrant any consideration in a due
process action.

Second, due process protection must relate to some state action. 138 The
due process clause prohibits federal and state governments from unfairly
depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property. However, due process
does not apply to the conduct of private parties. 139 Therefore, if an MCO is
a private entity, it may argue that physicians have no due process rights
with respect to its decisions. The issue of state action has been argued
extensively with respect to hospitals terminating medical staff privileges.
Although some variations exist among jurisdictions, most courts have held
that even though hospitals provide charitable benefits, receive tax
exemption, receive Medicare and Medicaid payments, and are subject to
extensive state and federal regulation, a hospital's actions are not
governmental actions. 40 These hospital cases could be used to argue
against the presence of state action in MCO decisions.

133. 986 S.W.2d 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
134. Id. at 578-79.
135. Id. at 580-81.
136. Id.
137. Id. (noting, however, that plaintiff did not allege that the PPO failed to follow its
own procedures, which may indicate the court might have been inclined to review the action
if the PPO failed to follow its own guidelines).
138. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
139. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
140. Craig Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals' Physician
Credentialingand Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 597, 629-30 (2000). See also
Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., Inc., 816 F.2d 1248, 1252 (8th Cir. 1987), affd, 859
F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1988); Babcock v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 543 N.W.2d 749, 759 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1996) (observing that state action exists when it can be shown that the state is
responsible for the specific act of which plaintiff complains).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol16/iss1/7

20

Cook: Will Pay for Performance Be Worth the Price to Medical Providers?

Pay for Performance Worth the Price

2007]

In Carliniv. Highmark, however, a physician successfully argued that an
HMO was a state actor for due process purposes. 1 4' The defendants in this
case were Keystone, an HMO, and its parent corporation, Highmark Blue
Cross and Blue Shield (Highmark), a professional health services plan
corporation (PHSPC).14 2 Keystone notified Dr. Carlini that the credentials
committee denied his re-credentialing application due to his history of
malpractice claims. 143 Dr. Carlini appealed and was given a hearing before
a panel of two physicians. 144 The hearing panel recommended reversal of
the credentials committee decision. 145 Despite this recommendation, the
credentials committee upheld its initial decision. 146 Dr. Carlini brought an
action against the defendants, alleging violation of his due process rights
because1 47the hearing process was not conducted in a fair and impartial
manner.
The defendants first argued that the HMO Act should apply because Dr.
Carlini was terminated from Keystone and not Highmark. 148 The
distinction was significant because the HMO Act did not grant a right to a
On the contrary, the Professional Health Services Plan
hearing.
49
Corporation Act (PHSPCA) mandated a hearing prior to termination.
Additionally, the PHSPCA provided that all disputes should be considered
and determined by the bylaws of the corporation. 50 Highmark's bylaws
required a medical review committee to conduct a hearing. Furthermore,
under Highmark's bylaws, the medical review committee's decision was
dispositive. 5 1 The court held that the PHSPCA applied. During the
termination process, Highmark sent a letter to Dr. Carlini notifying him that
all of its managed care networks, including Keystone, used its bylaws for
held that the HMO
their credentialing processes. 152 Additionally, the court
53
Act and the PHSPCA were not "mutually exclusive."'
The defendants in Carlini also argued that they did not engage in state
action and therefore were not obligated to provide due process to Dr.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

756 A.2d 1182, 1187-88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
Id.at 1183-84.
Id.at 1184.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carlini v. Highmark, 756 A.2d 1182, 1187-88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
Id.at 1186.
Id.
Id.at 1184.
Id.at 1186-87.
Id. at 1190.
Carlini, 756 A.2d at 1185.
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Carlini during the credentialing process.154 The court rejected this argument
and held that the hearing panel process used to evaluate Dr. Carlini's
credentials was analogous to a review committee formed pursuant to the
PHSPCA and, as such, was a "creature of the state" that must follow due
process standards.155 The court ultimately determined that Dr. Carlini's due
process 6rights were violated because he was not given an impartial
15
forum.
Carlini is significant for physicians for three reasons. First, it highlights
the importance of reviewing all state laws that may require HMOs and other
MCOs to provide a hearing prior to termination. As illustrated in this case,
MCOs may be governed by multiple statutory schemes as a result of their
corporate structure and affiliations. Second, the court treated Highmark as
a state agency because it was required to adhere to a certain statutory
scheme. Finally, the court required the MCO to provide due process
beyond mere adherence to statutory provisions.
In addition to due process rights and statutory protections, providers
should review their agreements with MCOs regarding termination and
performance scoring issues. These agreements often provide for a hearing
process in the event of termination due to competency or utilization issues.
However, most of these contracts also allow for termination without cause.
In most contracts, if the MCO terminates the provider without cause, there
is no provision for a hearing. Several cases have involved physicians who
requested judicial review of termination decisions based on a "no cause"
contract provision.
In Pannozzo v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield, a physician
challenged a no cause termination provision.15 7 The physician had
maintained medical provider agreements with the defendant for ten years
until he was notified that he was being removed from the defendant's
preferred provider list pursuant to the no cause contract provision.158 The
physician sued for breach of express and implied contract and for violation
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.1 59 The court ruled in favor of the
defendant and rejected the physician's argument that he had
a right to due
160
process based on public policy or common law principles.
154. Id.
155. Id. (relying on Rudolph v. Pa. Blue Shield, 717 A.2d 508 (Pa. 1998) in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a medical review committee formed pursuant to the
PHSPCA was a "creature of the state").
156. Id. at 1188.
157. 787 N.E.2d 91, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
158. Id. at 92-93.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 98.
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In contrast, the California Supreme Court extended its common law right
to fair procedure to a situation in which a physician was removed from an
insured's provider list without cause. 161 In Potvin v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., the court held that where an insurer has such substantial
power that a physician's removal from the preferred provider list would
significantly impair the physician from practicing in a particular geographic
area, an insurer must comply with the common law right to fair
procedure. 162 Moreover, the court explained that "fair procedure" means
that the
insurer's decision should be substantively rational and procedurally
163
fair.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has also accepted the public
policy argument. In Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, a physician
was terminated without cause after he was initially notified that his contract
164
was being terminated because he did not meet "recredentialing criteria."
The court held that an HMO's decision to terminate a physician must
comply with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and cannot be made
for a reason that contravenes public policy. 165 A physician who has been
terminated without cause can challenge the decision in the courts if he or
she believes that the decision to terminate was really based on some factor
contrary to public policy or that the decision to terminate was made in bad
66
faith. 1
As the cases demonstrate, providers will have a difficult time invoking
due process rights with respect to performance scores and plan termination.
For this reason, it behooves providers to review applicable state statutes and
contracts. Proper contract provisions are essential for providers. Providers
who participate in P4P should insist on including the following provisions
in their contracts: (1) a description of how performance will be measured;
(2) a process for challenging the results of the performance evaluation; (3) a
description of the MCO's policy for addressing low performance scores;
and (4) a description of the hearing process for termination decisions.
C. Discoverabilityof P4PInformation
Pay for performance will generate more information regarding the
performance and practice history of providers. Plaintiffs will likely seek to
discover information generated as a result of P4P. The most obvious targets
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1160-61 (Cal. 2000).
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1159-60.
674 A.2d 962, 965 (N.H. 1996).
Id. at 966.
Id.
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of discovery include clinical guidelines relevant to the standard of care at
issue and all documents relating to the provider's performance. This
section addresses whether information obtained as part of the P4P program
will be discoverable.
Analysis of any discovery issue should begin with the applicable scope
of discovery. Most state discovery rules mirror Rule 26(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows discovery regarding any matter if
the material is not privileged and is relevant to the claim or defense of the
parties. 167 Relevancy, for purposes of discovery, is not limited to
information that will be admissible at trial as long as the discovery appears
to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. 168 Therefore, the two main discovery arguments are privilege and
relevancy.
1. Peer Review
Privileged materials should be the first consideration because discovery
of such is prohibited. For cases brought in state court, the peer review
privilege is based upon individual state statutory provisions, so the ultimate
conclusion regarding discoverability will depend upon the statutory and
case law in each particular state. However, a few universal principles guide
the analysis as the privilege is reviewed in the context of clinical guidelines
and provider performance results.
a. Clinical Guidelines
One of the central components of P4P is that providers must follow
certain clinical guidelines or evidence-based medicine guidelines. 69 In
order to fully appreciate all of the issues regarding clinical guidelines,
counsel should have a good understanding of guidelines and how they are
created. Clinical guidelines have been around for approximately sixty years
and began as an attempt to standardize the practice of medicine. 170 In
recent years, the number of guidelines has increased significantly.
Guidelines are used frequently in litigation because they have become
increasingly available to the public. 171 The Agency for Health Care Policy
167.
168.

FED.

R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

Id.

169. Clinical guidelines have also been referred to as performance standards, practice
parameters, practice guidelines, and clinical indicators.
170. John D. Ayers, The Use And Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J. LEGAL
MED. 421, 421 (1994).
171. Id. See also Jodi M. Finder, The Future of Practice Guidelines Should They
Constitute Conclusive Evidence of The Standard of Care?, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 67 (2000)

(discussing the history and use of clinical guidelines).
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and Research defined clinical guidelines as "systematically developed
statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate
health care for specific clinical conditions.' ' 2 Clinical guidelines may or
may not differ from evidence-based medicine, which one physician
described as follows:
[E]vidence-based medicine is a way of doing medicine that takes into
consideration the scientific information that is available ...[I]f there is
good evidence that one particular method should be used, then it is [the
physician's] responsibility to use that method, but where that evidence is
lacking or inadequate, then we use our 73best clinical judgment to render
the safest care possible for our patients.'
By this definition, the term "evidence-based medicine" connotes actual
74
standard of care, as opposed to a guideline, which is not mandatory.
Naturally, this distinction can be very important.
The origin of the guideline may also be an important issue. Many
entities, including specialty practice organizations, local and federal
medical societies, insurance companies, peer review organizations, and
state and federal governments create guidelines. 175 The origin of the
guideline may reflect its purpose. An insurance company may create
practice guidelines for the purpose of containing costs. On the other hand,
most specialty practice organizations, such as the American Association of
Clinical Endocrinologists, create guidelines to establish professional
treatment standards. 176

172. William A. Trail & Brad A. Allen, Government Created Medical Practice
Guidelines: The Opening of Pandora'sBox, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 231, 234 (1996) (quoting
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, DEPRESSION IN PRIMARY CARE: VOLUME
2 TREATMENT OF MAJOR DEPRESSION, inside cover (1993)).
See generally National

Guideline Clearinghouse, http://www.guidelines.gov (hosting a comprehensive database of
clinical guidelines) (last visited October 1, 2006).
173. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 984-985
(N.D.Cal. 2004).
174. See generally Williams, supra note 8 (discussing the differences between clinical
guidelines and evidence-based medicine).
175. Andrew Hyams, et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An
Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 289, 289 (1996).

176. See also American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists, American Association
of Clinical Endocrinologists Protocol For Standardized Production of Clinical Practice
Guidelines, ENDOCRINE PRAC., Vol. 10 No. 4, July/Aug. 2004, at 353 (noting that the
American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists aims to produce clinical guidelines to
promote the dissemination of information about endocrinology to specialists and nonspecialists and to "provide a consensus opinion about the appropriate management of certain
clinical
problems
facing
the
practicing
endocrinologist"),
available at
http://www.aace.com/pub/pdf/guidelines/GLStandards.pdf.
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In typical malpractice litigation, clinical guidelines are usually not an
issue during discovery because the guidelines are found outside of a
healthcare entity's peer review or quality improvement process. Attorneys
may find potentially applicable guidelines by simply searching a multitude
of sources on the Internet or seeking the assistance of an expert.
Additionally, a plaintiffs attorney can depose the defendant and ask
whether the defendant followed any guidelines in the diagnosis and
treatment of the plaintiff, or whether the defendant was aware of any
applicable guidelines regarding the particular diagnosis and treatment. If
the plaintiffs counsel wants to use a particular guideline at trial, she can
attempt to get the defendant to acknowledge the authority of the guideline,
the applicability of the
guideline, or at least the authority of the entity that
77
issued the guideline.1
Pay for performance is significant here because it has the potential to
make clinical guidelines subject to the peer review privilege. One might
argue that the development of P4P clinical guidelines is a peer review
function because guidelines are part of the process of reviewing and
evaluating services delivered by healthcare providers. Several conditions
must be present, but depending on the jurisdiction, it may be possible to
make a cogent argument regarding the applicability of the privilege. If the
privilege is found to apply, discovery will be limited and the admissibility
of guidelines will also be prohibited because peer review is not discoverable
or admissible as evidence.178 The two pivotal issues regarding the
applicability of the privilege are: (1) whether the body that issued the
guideline is included within the specific definition of a peer review entity;
and (2) whether the issuance of a guideline falls within the definition of
peer review activities or functions. 179
The first inquiry is whether the entity that promulgated the guideline for
the P4P program falls within the definition of a peer review entity. For
example, a state statute might define a peer review entity to include an
insurance company, HMO, or a corporation comprised of healthcare
providers that evaluate health care or services. 80 If an HMO creates a
guideline, it may potentially meet this definition. However, it is also
important to know exactly which HMO committee or department created
the P4P clinical guideline. If the utilization committee creates the
guideline, for example, then it may not qualify for the privilege.

177.
178.
179.
180.

See Finder, supra note 171, at 96.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915(b) (2005).
See, e.g., id. § 65-4915(a)-(b) (2005).
See, e.g., id. § 65-4915(a) (2005).
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In State ex rel. Tennill v. Roper, the court interpreted the definition of a
peer review entity rather narrowly by ruling that a company, which
contracted with a peer review entity to implement cost containment
measures, did not fall within the definition.' 8 1 In this case, a physician
reviewer from Sunderbruch, the cost containment company, limited the
inpatient hospital stay of a patient who had been suffering from
183
depression.' 82 The patient committed suicide on the day of discharge.
The parents of the patient sued the hospital, a physician, and
The parents sought to discover information about
Sunderbruch. 184
Sunderbruch's evaluation of the case, but the company argued that the peer
review privilege prohibited discovery of the information.' 85 The court first
noted that, under Missouri law, a peer review committee's responsibility
did include healthcare utilization.' 86 However, the definition of a peer
review committee was specifically limited to: (1) state, local, or county
societies of healthcare professionals; (2) healthcare professionals of a
professional healthcare corporation; (3) hospitals or health facilities; and (4)
any other organization formed pursuant to state or federal law authorized to
exercise the responsibilities of a peer review committee. 87 Sunderbruch
argued that it met the fourth category because it contracted with a state
employee health plan formed pursuant to state law.' 88 The court ruled that
the contractual relationship with a state organization was insufficient to
meet the definition because, under
the statute, the organization itself had to
89
be formed pursuant to state law.'
However, a Texas court has ruled that an HMO's quality assurance
committee meets the definition of a peer review entity. 90 In the case of In
re Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., the plaintiffs sued the health plan for
negligence in medical case management, disease management, and quality
During discovery, the plaintiffs sought health plan
assurance. 191
documents, including the quality assurance guidelines that the health plan
issued to its physicians. 92 Interestingly, Humana produced its quality
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
2005).
191.
192.

State ex rel. Tennill v. Roper, 965 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 946.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 947.
Id.
State ex rel. Tennill v. Roper, 965 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
Id.
In re Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., 2005 WL 1629924, at *1 (Tex. App.
Id.
Id.
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assurance policies and procedures and stated they were not privileged, but
claimed that the information gathered as part of the quality assurance
program was privileged. 193 The plaintiffs argued that quality improvement
was a separate function
from peer review and was not covered by the peer
94
review privilege.'
The court reviewed several applicable statutory provisions and
definitions. First, the court noted that under Texas law, an HMO was
required to establish a quality assurance program.' 95 The court further
observed that under another statute, records and proceedings of "medical
196
committees" are confidential and are not subject to subpoena.
Furthermore, the definition of medical committee included "committees of
HMOs."' 197 The court also reviewed the peer review statutes and ruled that
the health plan's HMO quality assurance committee met the definition of a
98
peer review committee.'
If the entity that promulgated the guideline is considered a peer review
entity, then the next question is whether the creation and/or issuance of the
clinical guideline qualifies as a peer review activity or function. For
example, in Fulton DeKalb Hospital Authority v. Dawson, the court held
that peer review immunity would not be applied to the defendants, even
though they met the definition of a peer review organization, because the
acts in question were not peer review activities as defined by statute. 199
Similarly, the court in Claypool v. Mladineo held that even though the
statutory definition of a peer review committee was broad, the privilege
would not be applied to "committees where peer review of quality
assurance is a peripheral function., 200 It is important then for providers to
inquire whether the issuance of clinical guidelines is part of the peer review
process in a P4P program.
Parties seeking discovery may argue that a guideline resembles a policy
or procedure as opposed to a peer review activity, which connotes the actual
process of reviewing the quality of care. However, some courts consider
internal process records to be included within the peer review function. In
Zajac v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, the court held that the nature
and content of a hospital's internal review process is included within peer
193.
194.
195.

2005).
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id. at *2.
In re Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., 2005 WL 1629924, at *3 (Tex. App.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
Id.
509 S.E.2d 28, 31 (Ga. 1998).
724 So.2d 373, 387 (Miss. 1998).
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review functions. 20 1 The court reasoned that the procedures were used for
quality control and patient care improvement.2 2 In Ekstrom v. Temple, the
plaintiff sued a hospital after developing toxic shock syndrome.20 3 The
plaintiff sought to discover the hospital infection committee's internal
guidelines and records regarding the hospital's compliance with the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
guidelines and standards.20 4 The court ruled that the hospital infection
committee's own guidelines were privileged.20 5 However, with respect to
documents regarding JCAHO compliance, the court noted that the hospital
failed to show the applicability of the privilege because it did not prove that
a peer review committee would generate the compliance records.20 6
If the clinical guideline is available from other sources, then the peer
review privilege may not be applicable. Stratienko v. ChattanoogaHamilton County Hospital Authority involved the analysis of a peer review
statute that included a common exception for documents "otherwise
available from original sources. ,,207 The defendant argued that the statute
should be interpreted to mean that the plaintiff could discover the
information from the original source, but not from the peer review
208
committee.
The court disagreed and ruled that documents otherwise
available from original sources were not privileged. 20 9 Therefore, if a P4P
program adopts a clinical guideline created by another entity, such as a
specialty organization, then such a guideline will probably not be afforded a
discovery privilege in states where the peer review statutes include an
exception for original source documents.
Finally, the party seeking discovery may try to determine whether any of
the parties have waived the privilege by providing the information outside
of the peer review context. For example, if a P4P program publicizes its
guidelines, then the privilege should not apply. 210 However, P4P programs

201.

571 N.E.2d 840, 845-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).

202. Id. at 846.
203. 553 N.E.2d 424, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
204. Id. at 426.
205. Id. at 429.
206. Id.
207. 2006 WL 550460 at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
208. Id. at *5.
209. Id. at *6. See also Humana Hosp. Desert Valley v. Superior Court of Ariz., 742
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that information available from original
sources is not immune from discovery or use at trial merely because it was used by a medical
review committee).
210.

See, e.g., Marshall v. Planz, 145 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1268 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (holding

that a statement made outside peer review process was not subject to privilege).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2007

29

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 16

will probably not waive the privilege by providing the guidelines to its
participating providers.211
b. Physician PerformanceInformation
The same peer review privilege analysis applies to documents relating to
a provider's performance. Again, the first issue is whether the entity
reviewing the performance meets the statutory definition of a peer review
committee. For example, in the McClellan case, the plaintiffs sought to
discover the application files and investigations that the HMO had
performed with respect to the primary care physician.21 2 The HMO argued
that these materials were subject to the peer review privilege. The court
reviewed the peer review statutes and noted that the privilege only applied
to specific healthcare providers defined under the statute. The statutory
definition of a peer review committee did not cover an HMO.213
If the entity meets the definition of a peer review provider, it should
follow that review of a physician's performance falls within the definition
of peer review activities. Most statutes include a rather broad definition of
peer review activities. For example, in Kansas, peer review includes the
evaluation and improvement of "the quality of healthcare services rendered
by healthcare providers" and the evaluation of the performance of
healthcare providers.21 4 When a P4P program reviews and analyzes a
provider's performance, it evaluates the quality of health care. If the P4P
program evaluates providers within another context, such as the utilization
review process, the argument to include that evaluation as a peer review
activity weakens.
Finally, if information is privileged, the provider needs to maintain the
privilege. If a physician participates in the Medicare PVRP and receives
performance results from CMS, that physician should not disclose those
results to any outside sources; otherwise, she may compromise the
privilege.

211.

See, e.g.,Young v. Saldanha, 431 S.E.2d 669, 675 (W.Va. 1993) (noting that the

doctor did not waive privilege by gaining access to his own peer review documents). See
also Wall v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 1233, 1240-41 (Ohio Ct. App.

1997) (holding that committee did not waive privilege by providing peer review document to
physician).
212. McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 686 A.2d 801, 803 (Pa. 1996).
213. Id. at 806. See also Henderson v. Biwojno, 47 Pa. D. & C.4th 322, 331 (Pa.Com.
P1. 2000) (excluding HMO from statutory definition of peer review). But cf. Pardell v.
Humana, 560 So.2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (including HMO peer review
within the statutory definition of peer review committee).
214.

KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 65-4915(a)(3) (2004).
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c. FederalLaw Regarding Peer Review
In some instances, disputes between providers themselves, disputes
between providers and P4P programs, or malpractice cases could make their
way into federal court. In that situation, Federal Rule of Evidence 501
governs. This rule provides that if the claims are brought pursuant to
federal law, the federal common law regarding privilege applies. 21 5 Prior to
2005, no federal statutory medical peer review privilege provisions existed.
Therefore, in most instances, the peer review privilege did not apply in
federal court. In Tucker v. United States, for example, the district court
found that federal law provides the rule of decision with respect to
malpractice claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act and a
pendent state law claim. 1 6 The court then ruled that there was no federal
medical peer review privilege.2 17 Similarly, in Atteberry v. Longmont
United Hospital, the court held that federal law provided the rule of
decision with respect to claims brought under the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). 2 8 The court ruled that there
was no federal statutory medical peer review privilege and declined to
apply the state law privilege under the principle of comity, even though the
evidence sought might have been relevant to the pendent malpractice claims
that were brought against a physician under state law. 219 Thus, a clever
plaintiffs attorney could have added an EMTALA claim to a state
negligence case, filed in federal court, and consequently avoided the peer
review privilege.
In 2005, Congress enacted the first federal medical peer review privilege
in the Patient Safety & Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA). 220 The
PSQIA establishes a mechanism for certain providers to report information
regarding medical errors and patient safety. Reporting is voluntary, but
Congress has included the peer review privilege as an incentive for
reporting. 22 1 The PSQIA privilege preempts less stringent state peer review
laws and applies in all222 federal and state proceedings, including
administrative proceedings.
Generally, if a provider develops a patient safety work product and
reports that work product to a patient safety organization, then such work

215.

Sonnino v. Univ. Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 643 (D. Kan. 2004).

216. 143 F.Supp. 2d 619, 625-26 (S.D. W. Va. 2001).
217. Id. at 626.
218. 221 F.R.D. 644, 646 (D. Colo. 2004).
219. Id. at 647-49.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21 (2006).
221. Id. § 299b-23(a) (2006).
222. Id. § 299b-22(a)(5) (2006).
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product is subject to the federal peer review privilege.2 23 A patient safety
organization can be a private or public entity, but it must be certified by the
Department of Health and Human Services and must meet certain
criteria.224 "Patient safety work product" is defined to include any data or
records that a provider assembled or developed in order to conduct "patient
safety activities" that could result in improved patient safety or healthcare
quality.2 25 The term "patient safety activities" is defined fairly broadly and
includes efforts to improve healthcare safety and quality as well as the
development and dissemination of protocols or information regarding best
2 6 Arguably, many aspects of a P4P program meet the definition
practices. 226
of patient safety activities. However, a number of other requirements must
be met to invoke the privilege in the P4P context.
First, the statute specifically defines the term "provider," but this
definition does not include insurance companies or MCOs. The definition
of provider is limited to certain individuals who actually provide care and to
entities licensed to provide care, such as hospitals and long-term care
facilities.227 Therefore, a P4P program itself could not claim the privilege.
Secondly, the provider itself would have to take the initiative to create a
safety evaluation system. Additionally, the provider must assemble or
develop the patient safety work product information in order to report it to a
patient safety organization, and it must actually report it to a safety patient
organization.
Finally, patient safety work product does not include
"information that is collected, maintained, or developed
separately, or exists
228
separately, from the patient evaluation system.,
If a healthcare provider who participates in a P4P program wants to take
advantage of PSQIA and its privilege provision, the provider must develop
a patient safety evaluation system pursuant to the statute and to all the P4P
requirements, and data must be collected, maintained, and developed within
the broader patient safety evaluation system. Even then, however, the party
seeking discovery might argue that if certain data is reported to a P4P
program, that data might not be subject to the privilege.
Representing providers that are contemplating a P4P program requires
strict scrutiny of the peer review issue. If the proposed P4P program
considers the evaluation of performance in conjunction with state peer
review statutes, it should be able to protect performance results and
possibly even specific clinical guidelines from discovery. Providers should
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. § 299b-21(7) (2006).
Id. § 299b-24 (2006).
Id. § 299b-21(7) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(5) (2006).
Id. §299b-21(8) (2006).
Id. §299b-21(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
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know which entity will be issuing guidelines and reviewing performance,
and whether that entity is covered under the peer review statute. Providers
should also determine whether the requisite type of review falls within the
peer review definition. Additionally, the type and content of the
performance information released to the public is also relevant. Providers
should be ready for a plaintiff to argue that the privilege does not apply to
P4P performance information if much of the information is disclosed to the
physician and the public through the report cards and awards systems.229
Moreover, both providers and their counselors should consider taking
advantage of the new federal peer review privilege statute.
2. Relevancy
a. Clinical Guidelines
If the peer review privilege does not apply, parties opposing discovery
may object to the information's relevancy. However, in all likelihood,
relevancy will not be an issue with respect to clinical guidelines. The
determination of the standard of care is a central issue in malpractice cases.
If a plaintiff was covered by a plan that included a P4P program and the
plaintiff requested copies of all P4P clinical guidelines applicable to the
patient's diagnosis or treatment, an objection to relevancy would likely fail.
b. PerformanceResults
Unlike the triviality of a relevancy objection with respect to guidelines,
relevancy is a more significant issue in the discovery of performance
results. Arguably, information regarding a provider's prior performance or
practice with respect to other patients is not relevant in a malpractice action
against a provider. The key to this issue is how a plaintiff frames the
argument for relevancy. A plaintiff will likely lose if he argues that
evidence of a physician's poor performance history tends to prove
negligence in a particular case. Generally, evidence of other acts is not
admissible to establish a person's character and propensity in order to infer
However, performance information may be
conformity therewith. 230
relevant for other reasons, such as to demonstrate habit or custom, or for

229. For example, Medicare plans to provide physicians with performance feedback in
the PVRP. If the physician does not treat this information in a confidential and privileged
manner, a plaintiff may successfully argue that the privilege has been waived.
230. FED. R. EvID. 404(a).
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impeachment. 23 Further, the information may be relevant to impugn the
physician's qualifications if the treating physician testifies as an expert.
The decision in J. W. v. B.B.232 provides an excellent analysis of
relevancy of performance results in this context. In that case, two
individuals brought malpractice claims against the defendant for performing
unnecessary digital-rectal prostate exams during an employment
physical. 3 The plaintiffs requested information regarding the defendant's
employment history and whether he previously had complaints against him
for inappropriate touching or for performing unnecessary or inappropriate
rectal or prostate exams.234
The court held that while evidence of other allegations could not be used
to show that the defendant acted in conformity in these instances, the
information could be relevant for other purposes.235 In reaching its
conclusion, the court explained that if the defendant physician testified that
he performed these exams on all healthy males because he believed the
standard of care required it, evidence that he has been fired for performing
these exams could be used to impeach his testimony.23 6 Additionally, if the
defendant denied performing the exams and testified that it was not his
complaints
usual routine to perform these exams, then evidence of prior
237
could be used for impeachment and to show custom and habit.
In contrast, the plaintiff failed to articulate a sufficient basis for
relevancy in the case of Youle v. Ryan.238 In that case, the plaintiff sued the
defendant for malpractice after he transected the plaintiffs common bile
duct during a cholecystectomy. 239 During a subsequent deposition, the
doctor disclosed that he had maintained a database of all of his surgeries.24 °
The database contained basic information about each surgery, including the
type of surgery and whether there were any complications. 241 The plaintiff
requested the database, arguing that it would show evidence of a pattern of
negligence.2 42 The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and allowed the
discovery, not because it might show a pattern of negligence, but because

231.

FED. R. EvD. 406, 407.

232.

700 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005).

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 280.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 284.
Id.

238.

811 N.E.2d 1281 (Il. App. Ct. 2004).

239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 1282.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
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the defendant planned to testify as an expert about the standard of care.24 3
The court decided that information in the database could be relevant on the
issue of the defendant's qualifications as an expert.244
The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the decision in Youle, remanding
the case to the trial court for an in camera review of the documents.245
However, it seems that the court of appeals never got past the plaintiffs
initial argument regarding a pattern of negligence. The court of appeals
specifically questioned how records of hundreds of other patients could be
relevant to the issue of whether the defendant was negligent with respect to
the plaintiff.246 The court also noted that even though the defendant did not
explicitly raise the issue of confidentiality, the information in the database
could be confidential information covered by the physician-patient
privilege.2 47
Performance results may be sought in cases other than provider
malpractice. In a case against an MCO for negligent credentialing, a
plaintiff could have a strong argument that the provider's performance
results are not merely relevant, but they probably constitute the most
relevant information in the case. Thus, counsel may be able to avoid the
relevancy objection by adding the MCO as a defendant in the case.
If a court determines that a provider's performance information is
discoverable, then the party seeking to introduce the evidence has the
burden to demonstrate that the evidence is admissible. The next two
sections analyze the admissibility of clinical guidelines and performance
ratings.
D. Admissibility of Clinical Guidelines
A plaintiff or provider may introduce evidence of a clinical guideline to
establish the applicable standard of care.248 The admissibility of medical
guidelines is clearly a significant factor in malpractice cases. The practice
of medicine is a profession, so generally the only way to establish the

243. Idat 1282-83.
244. Youle v. Ryan, 811 N.E.2d 1281, 1282-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
245. Idat 1285.
246. Idat 1284.
247. Id. at 1284-85.
248. The admissibility of clinical standards is not a new issue but continues to be
debated. One of the earliest cases is Stone v. Proctor, 131 S.E.2d 297 (N.C. 1963). In this
case plaintiff sued a psychiatrist for negligence in administering electroshock therapy
("EST"). At trial, the court allowed plaintiff to introduce standards on EST promulgated by
the American Psychiatric Association as evidence of the standard of care. The court noted
that the standards reflected a consensus among these specialists regarding the use of EST and
that they should be followed. Id. at 299.
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standard of care is by presenting expert testimony.249 In many cases,
determining the standard of care comes down to a battle of the experts.
Clinical guidelines are valuable because they can provide the trier of fact
with more tangible evidence of the standard of care. The admissibility of
guidelines can be supported by various legal arguments, depending on the
jurisdiction. However, before deciding which of the arguments should be
advanced in a particular case, counsel should understand the particular
clinical guideline at issue and how it was created.
The origin and purpose of a guideline is particularly important in relation
to P4P programs. The fact that a guideline was created for a P4P program
may be the determining factor with respect to admissibility. One clear
example of this appears in Quigley v. Jobe.250 In Quigley, the plaintiff
presented to her physician after discovering a lump in her right breast.251
The plaintiff claimed that although the defendant performed a breast exam,
he failed to provide her with instructions to return for a follow-up exam and
to instruct her to perform self-exams. 2 The plaintiff was diagnosed with
breast cancer one year after the defendant's exam. 3 At trial, the court
excluded evidence of a practice guideline contained within the defendant's
malpractice liability policy.

254

The guideline recommended that the

physician instruct patients to return for a follow-up exam six weeks after
discovery of a palpable lesion.255 The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's decision, ruling that the guideline was not relevant because it was
established by an insurance company and did not reflect the applicable
standard of care.256
As payors establish many P4P programs in an attempt to reduce costs,
clinical guidelines in these programs may be susceptible to relevancy
arguments like those set forth in Quigley. However, if a P4P program
merely adopts a guideline from a professional organization, then the
guideline could still be relevant even though it is used by a payor to reduce
costs. The issue of relevancy becomes even further complicated because
many P4P guidelines are developed by a consensus of several different
groups. Insurers might create the P4P guidelines, but they will still

249.

See id.

250. 851 P.2d 236 (Colo. App. 1992).
251. Id. at237.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 238.
255. Id. at 237-38 (discussing the defendant's agreement to incorporate the guideline
into his practice. According to the policy, failure to comply with the guideline could result
in an additional charge or non-renewal of the policy).
256. 851 P.2d 236 (Colo. App. 1992).
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generally draw from input of medical professionals. The guidelines might
be created with a dual purpose of establishing the standard of care and
reducing costs.
After researching the background of a guideline, including its origin and
use, the next step is to analyze the legal arguments for the admission or
exclusion of the guideline.
Admissibility depends, in part, on the
jurisdiction. However, the available legal arguments can be categorized
into four different areas: 1) learned treatise; 2) the expert's opinion
regarding standard of care; 3) industry safety standards; and 4)
impeachment on cross-examination.
First, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence 803(18), learned
treatises are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if certain
conditions are met. Rule 803(18) states as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon crossexamination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination,
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a
subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a
reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by
other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the 257
statements
may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
This rule provides a solid basis for the admissibility of guidelines in federal
court. Arguably, some clinical guidelines should be considered learned
treatises and should therefore be admissible under this rule during direct or
cross-examination. Several states have also adopted the learned treatises
hearsay exception. 58 Under this rule, admissibility may again depend on
the origin of the guideline. A clinical guideline promulgated by the
American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists would likely meet the
definition of a learned treatise, but a guideline promulgated by an MCO
probably would not. Additionally, the learned treatise rule does impose an
important limitation in that the guidelines may not be received as actual
exhibits.

257. FED. R. EviD. 803(18).
258. See, e.g., Scott v. Grimes, 2003 WL 1251975 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that an
American College of Obstetricians Gynecologists publication was admissible as learned
treatise under KRE 803(18)); Wilson v. Knight, 982 P.2d 400, 403 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that medical journal articles were properly admitted as independent substantive
evidence under learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-460(cc));
and Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 369 (R.I. 1998) (holding that medical text
should have been admitted under learned treatise rule of evidence).
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Second, another common argument for admissibility is that a guideline
may be admissible if an expert testifies that the guideline represents the
actual standard of care. This testimony can be elicited when an expert is
asked to define the applicable standard of care. 259 However, to maintain
admissibility, it is crucial to ensure that the expert does not diverge from
this point. If an expert waivers even a small amount in stating that the
guideline is the standard of care, then the basis for admissibility is lost.
Courts view a guideline as a recommendation differently than a guideline as
an evidence-based practice that represents the actual mandated standard of
care. If an expert testifies that a guideline represents only one way to
approach treatment, then that guideline is insufficient. Additionally, some
states prohibit using learned treatises to bolster expert witness opinions.260
In these states, it is much more difficult to admit evidence of guidelines as
261
the standard of care on direct examination.
The case of Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants provides a good example
of expert testimony and its influence on a guideline as the standard of
care. 262 In Frakes, the plaintiff presented to the defendant in the emergency
room with complaints of chest pain for several days.263 Results of a resting
EKG and X-ray were normal.264 The defendant ordered a treadmill EKG,
which was ended before completion due to the patient's complaints of
dismissed the patient, who died several
severe chest pain. 265 The defendant
266
hours after returning home.
During the trial, defense counsel cross-examined the plaintiffs expert
regarding the results of the treadmill EKG.267 Counsel used a table
published by the American College of Cardiology and American Heart
Association entitled, "Exercise Test Parameters Associated With Poor
Prognosis and/or Increased Severity of [Coronary Artery Disease]. ' 268 The
plaintiff's expert agreed that this table represented a consensus statement on
259. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 768 So.2d 803, 811 (La. Ct. App.
2000) (observing that, when asked about standard of care, the expert testified that applicable
clinical guidelines mandated certain treatments). Note that this approach is different from
admitting the guideline under the argument that it forms the basis of the expert's opinion.
Although this is a fine line, there is a distinction between these arguments. See FED. R.
EVID. 703. Some jurisdictions do not allow hearsay evidence even though it forms the basis
of the expert's opinion.
260. FED. R. EVID. 803 note to Paragraph (18).
261. Id.
262. 1997 WL 536949 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
263. Id. at*1.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at *2.
268. Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, 1997 WL 536949 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
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the interpretation of treadmill EKG tests. 269 The expert also agreed that
even though the test had not been completely finished, none of the results
obtained were abnormal according to the table. 270 During the plaintiffs
case, the defendant was called as a witness, and during his testimony he
stated that the guidelines included within the table represented the
27
applicable standard of care at the time he treated the plaintiff. '
After the plaintiff rested, counsel for the plaintiff moved the court to
prohibit the defendant from using the table with his expert during his
case. 272 The plaintiff cited the applicable Tennessee rule of evidence that
learned treatises may only be used for impeachment and not for substantive
purposes. The trial court denied the motion and even allowed the chart to
be viewed by the jury over a hearsay objection, ruling that the experts had
adopted the chart as the standard of care.273
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the chart was improperly admitted
because it was hearsay and should have only been used for impeachment
purposes.2 74 The Tennessee Court of Appeals disagreed with the plaintiff.
The court provided the following explanation for its decision:
As the trial judge pointed out in ruling on the motion to admit the
document, the result was exactly the same as if one of the experts had
been asked to go to the board and list the standards to be applied in
interpreting the stress test. By the end of the trial the exhibit was simply a
statement of what at least two experts275testified was the standard of care
with respect to reading the test results.
In this case, the party seeking to introduce the guideline was successful
despite the rule on learned treatises. The success was largely due to the fact
that the defense attorney emphasized the guideline as a consensus
statement, which is another expression for the standard of care. 276 The
testimony of the experts supported the argument of the defense.
A concurring opinion in Frakes emphasized that medical guidelines
could be helpful to juries because they are more than just a sampling of
professional opinions. The concurring judge specifically opined that
269. Id.
270. Id. at *2-*3.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, 1997 WL 536949 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
275. Id.
276. See also Ensor v. Wilson, 519 So.2d 1244, 1265-66 (Ala. 1987) (stating that the
publication "Standards for Obstetrics and Gynecologists" published three years after the
alleged negligent act was admissible because an expert testified that the publication reflected
the actual standard of care at the time).
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relevant and properly authenticated medical guidelines are pertinent to the
issue of standard of care and should not be considered as learned treaties,
but should instead be admitted as substantive evidence.277
278
The decision in Frakes contrasts with that of Liberatore v. Kaufman.
In Liberatore, the plaintiff sued a physician and hospital as a result of
complications that ensued following a vaginal birth after cesarean
(VBAC).279 On direct examination, experts for the defendants testified
about a bulletin published by the American College of Gynecologists
(ACOG bulletin). 280 The first expert testified generally about the ACOG
bulletin and stated that the physician's treatment met the guidelines in the
ACOG bulletin. 28 1 The second expert testified that the ACOG bulletins
"don't represent the standard of care, that is, they don't represent the only
way people can do it, but they do represent one appropriate standard of
care. ' 282 The second expert testified that if the physician provided
treatment according to an ACOG bulletin, no one could claim a violation of
the standard of care. 283 Finally, the physician was specifically asked
whether the ACOG bulletin represented the standard of care, and, in
response, the defendant testified: "the... ACOG said, hey, it's safe to do
this., 284 Following a jury verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed.
The Florida Court of Appeals held that it was reversible error to introduce
285
the ACOG bulletin during direct examination of the defendant's experts.
The court cited the Florida statute, which allows learned treatises only on
cross-examination of experts, and held that experts cannot bolster their
opinions through the use of a treatise.286
The learned treatise statute in Liberatore was similar to the Tennessee
statute in Frakes. However, the courts reached different conclusions.. The
important distinction was the testimony of the experts regarding the
standard of care. The court in Liberatore clearly did not view the ACOG
bulletin as representing the standard of care because of the expert
testimony. In its opinion, the court described the ACOG bulletins as
containing "suggested treatment regimens, current trends, and other issues
277.
278.

Frakes, 1997 WL 536949 at *6.
835 So.2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 406-07.
Liberatore v. Kaufman, 835 So.2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 407.
Id. See Jeffrey S. Badgley, Using Medical Literature on Direct Examination To

Win The "Battle of The Experts" 77 FLA. B.J. 39 (2003) (discussing the admissibility of
medical literature with experts in Florida).
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of concern to the practicing obstetrician., 287 Liberatore also highlights the
importance of distinguishing guidelines from learned treatises in states that
prohibit such treatises on direct examination.
Another challenge to admitting clinical guidelines under the standard of
care argument is that clinical guidelines are not always a good
representation of the actual standard of care. Clinical guidelines simply
cannot address every situation. Symptoms and diseases do not always
cooperate and follow the same patterns. Furthermore, some patients have
competing conditions. For example, a patient may take medication for a
cardiac condition that may induce hypertension. If a provider treats the
heart condition, he may not be able to meet the guidelines or expected
outcomes for hypertension.
A recent study performed at Johns Hopkins emphasizes the. limitations of
clinical guidelines. 288 The study evaluated clinical guidelines for the
treatment of an elderly woman with multiple conditions, including
osteoporosis, diabetes, and arthritis. 289 According to the study, if all clinical
guidelines were followed, the patient would require twelve medications
daily at nineteen doses, five times per day.290 Researchers noted that the
problem is not just the expense and logistics of taking all the medicine, but
that each medicine increases the risk of medication error. 29 1 Additionally,
most medications have some adverse affects and can lead to negative
interactions.2 92 The guidelines also recommended multiple activities for the
patient, such as exercise, education, and further monitoring.293 These
recommendations did not always coincide.294 For example, the clinical
guideline for osteoporosis prescribed weight-bearing exercise, but the
guideline for diabetes recommended avoidance of such exercise. 295
The lead author for the study noted that specialty groups usually create
clinical guidelines, and those groups do not typically account for patients

287. Liberatore,835 So.2d at 406.
288. News Release, John Hopkins Medicine, Clinical Guidelines May Not Apply to
Older Patients With Several Chronic illnesses (August 9, 2005), available at
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/Press-releases/2005/0809a_05.html
[hereinafter Johns
Hopkins]; Cynthia M. Boyd et al., Clinical Practice Guidelines and Quality of Carefor
Older Patients with Multiple Comorbid Diseases:Implicationsfor Payfor Performance, 294
JAMA 716, 716 (2005).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. John Hopkins, supra note 288.
295. Id.
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with multiple conditions.296 According to the author, half of the population
over the age of sixty-five has three or more chronic diseases.2 97 The study
highlights the need, in many cases, for a physician's clinical judgment and
flexibility to formulate treatment plans specifically tailored to the patient
and her particular circumstances. 298 Therefore, as a practical matter, one of
the major considerations for admissibility is how easily a clinical guideline
can be applied to the patient's condition. The more judgment that a
treatment requires, the less persuasive is the argument that a clinical
guideline represents the standard of care.
Currently, most of the clinical guidelines that P4P programs adopt are
relatively basic, universally accepted guidelines. This makes it easier to
argue that the guidelines represent the actual standard of care. In addition,
unless a patient has multiple diagnoses, the standard conditions covered by
the guidelines should not require considerable physician judgment. This
may change if P4P programs incorporate more guidelines or if P4P
programs expand to more specialty practices.
Furthermore, if the guidelines that a party seeks to introduce come across
as mere recommendations rather than as the standard of care, there may be a
valid objection to relevancy. In Shuford by Shuford v. McIntosh, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly excluded an
ACOG guideline, noting that there was no showing of relevancy for the
documents "which on their face appear to be recommendations, rather than
standards applicable to either of the defendants. 299 In contrast, the District
of Columbia court in Washington v. Washington Hospital Center held that
guidelines that are not mandatory, but recommend or encourage certain
practices, are directly relevant to the issue of standard of care. 300 That court
are relevant as evidence of emerging or
held that such guidelines
30 1
developing standards.

Finally, if a court does not find that a guideline represents the standard of
care, then evidence of adherence to the guideline will not preclude

296.
297.
298.

Id.
Id.
Id.

299.

408 S.E.2d. 747, 750 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). It appears that plaintiff was able to

introduce the evidence at some other point in the trial.
300. 579 A.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
301. Id. at 182. See also Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 791 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224-25 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005) (holding that a guideline for evaluation for noncardiac surgery published by the
American College of Cardiology and the American Heart Association was properly admitted
where the document was not admitted as hearsay since it was not offered for the truth of the
matter, nor was it offered to establish the per se standard of care, but it was evidence of
defendant's decision-making process).
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liability.3 °2 Such was the case in Bankert by Bankert v. United States, a
malpractice case brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act for a delivery
at an Air Force hospital. 303 In that case, the mother was scheduled for a
VBAC.3 °4 Despite many ominous signs, including failed labor, pitocin
administration, and early signs of fetal distress, the physicians refused the
mother's request for a C-section.30 5 Finally, when the family practice
physician noted serious signs of fetal distress, she paged the surgeon.30 6
The C-section was performed within approximately thirty minutes of the
page to the surgeon. °7 The defendants argued that they were not negligent
because they followed an applicable ACOG guideline.30 8
The court noted that the ACOG guidelines in question required delivery
within thirty minutes of the decision to perform a C-section. 30 9 However,
the court explained that the ACOG guideline was merely a guideline and
actually represented the maximum period of time delay allowed. 310 The
court also noted that a guideline "cannot blindly address every situation of
The court held that, given the
emergency cesarean delivery. 3 1
circumstances of the case, the physician should have issued a stat page and
that there was an unreasonable delay in the delivery that constituted a
breach of the standard of care. 12
Providers are in a precarious position if a court finds that a P4P guideline
does not represent the standard of care. Physicians experienced this
firsthand in the case of Wickline v. California.313 In that case, the plaintiff,
a Medicaid recipient, underwent vascular surgery and experienced some
As the scheduled discharge date
postoperative complications.314
approached, the surgeon requested that the plaintiffs hospital stay be

302. Conversely, deviation from a guideline may not be negligence. See, e.g., Even v.
Bohle, 2002 WL 31640613 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (finding that deviation from a guideline
may not be negligence where the court held that ACOG guidelines were recommendations,
and the jury could find for defendant despite defendant's failure to adhere to ACOG
guidelines regarding forceps delivery).
303. 937 F.Supp. 1169 (D. Md. 1996).
304. Id. at 1173.
305. Id. at 1175.
306. Id. at 1177-78.
307. Id. at 1178.
308. Id.at ll81.
309. This guideline is described by many physicians as "thirty minutes from decision to
incision."
310. Bankert, 937 F.Supp. at 1182.
311. Id. at 1181.
312. Id. at 1182.
313. 192 Cal.App.3d 1630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
314. Id. at 1634-35.
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extended by eight days. 315 The request was taken through the Medicaid
utilization review process.3 16 The request for an additional eight days was
denied, but the plaintiff was allowed an additional four days.317 The
surgeon dismissed the plaintiff according to the utilization review
decision.31 8 After discharge, the plaintiff experienced more complications,
which ultimately resulted in an above-the-knee amputation. 31 9 The plaintiff
sued the State of California for negligence in its decision to discharge her
320
prematurely. The jury found for the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Wickline decision, however, and held
that the state was not liable because the Medicaid program did not override
the judgment of physicians.32 1 The court explained that a physician who
complies, without protest, with treatment limitations that a third-party payor
imposes could not avoid ultimate responsibility to the patient.322 Therefore,
according to Wickline, a physician should not blindly follow a P4P
guideline if the physician does not believe it represents the applicable
standard of care in that particular situation.323 However, failure to follow
the guidelines will result in lower performance ratings.
The third argument for admissibility of a guideline is admission as an
industry safety standard. For example, in Davenport ex rel. Davenport v.
Ephraim McDowell Memorial Hospital, the appellants argued that the trial
court erred by admitting clinical guidelines published by the American
Society of Post Anesthesia Nurses. 324 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
rejected the argument, noting that the guidelines should not be considered
as a learned treatise, but should be considered as safety standards that are
"helpful as a guide for measuring care." 325 Furthermore, in a physician
malpractice case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that evidence of
a hospital policy should be treated as a non-legislative safety standard.326
315. Id. at 1636.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1637-38.
318. Id. at 1640.
319. Wickline v. California, 192 Cal.App.3d 1630, 1641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
320. Id. at 1632-33.
321. Id. at 1645.
322. Id.
323. For liability purposes a physician would be well advised to document knowledge of
the applicability of the guideline and the reasons why the physician chose not to adhere to
the guideline in the particular case.
324. 769 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
325. Id. at 62. If a hospital formally adopts P4P standards, the same argument applies.
See, e.g., Lockwood v. Baptist Reg'l Health Serv., 541 So.2d 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that hospital policy and procedure manuals and books establishing industry
standards are admissible in negligence case against hospital).
326. Jackson v. Okla. Mem'l Hosp., 909 P.2d 765, 775 (Okla. 1995).
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The court ruled that a safety standard is material and relevant on the issue of
standard of care, but that "it does not establish the degree of care that is
legally due. 327
Finally, the last legal argument for guideline admissibility deals with
impeachment on cross-examination. In states that have statutes limiting the
admissibility of learned treatises to cross-examination, some courts have
already equated practice guidelines to learned treatises. Thus, the use of
guidelines is much more limited in these states. For example, courts in
Michigan and Florida have ruled that ACOG guidelines should be treated as
learned treatises and are only admissible on cross-examination or for
impeachment purposes.3 28 While it may be difficult to use guidelines in this
manner, it can still be effective. Additionally, it may still be worthwhile to
argue that a particular guideline is not a learned treatise, but rather that it is
evidence of the actual standard of care.
As this section demonstrates, it is important to be prepared before
arguing either for or against admissibility of a P4P guideline. Pay for
performance will only add to the trend of increased use and knowledge of
clinical guidelines, which means that courts will continue to face this issue.
Courts are not likely to establish one guiding principle for admissibility
because of the nature of guidelines and because parties tend to take
opposing positions with respect to admissibility. Counsel for parties can
anticipate that P4P will only expand and complicate the issue. For
example, if one aspect of a P4P program performance evaluation includes
whether a physician has the technology to track test results and issue alerts
and reminders to patients, a plaintiff may argue that the performance criteria
represents the standard of care, or at the very least, is akin to a practice
guideline, and should be admissible as such.
E. Admissibility of PerformanceResults
The purpose of P4P is to evaluate providers, and thus P4P will create
potential new evidence in the form of performance results. Some of the
results will be made public, for example, in the form of report cards or
provider ratings. 329 Other programs may give providers "star" or "blue
327. Id. See also Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical
Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 49 U. PA. L. REv. 645, 660 (2001)
(noting that a large number of cases follow these decisions regarding the admissibility of
safety or industry standards in malpractice cases).
328. Craig v. Oakwood Hosp., 643 N.W.2d 580, 600 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Green v.
Goldberg, 630 So.2d 606, 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
329. Public reporting is still in its infancy. The State of California Office of the Patient
Advocate has a website with a report card that provides an overall rating of medical groups
in
the
state.
State
of California,
Office
of the
Patient
Advocate,
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ribbon" status. 330 This type of public information will be general, but will
be available to anyone without having to resort to the discovery process.
More detailed performance results, however, will still require discovery
proceedings. Regardless of the level of detail, in some cases plaintiffs or
providers may want to introduce performance results as evidence.
The main objections to admission of this type of evidence are relevancy
The federal rules
and the rules prohibiting character evidence.33 1
distinguish between general character evidence and evidence of prior
specific acts. Evidence of a provider's overall performance status will be
considered as general character evidence under Rule 404(a) and will
generally not be admitted.332 For example, in McCaffrey v. Puckett, the
defendant's expert witness, a member of the State Board of Chiropractic
Examiners, testified that during his tenure on the Board, the plaintiff had
never been the subject of a complaint or disciplinary action.333 The
Mississippi Supreme Court held that this evidence was improper character
evidence because it was not relevant to the issue of whether the defendant
was negligent in his treatment of the plaintiff.334 In its decision, the court in

http://www.opa.ca.gov/report card/. Some of the results are based upon information
obtained from P4P programs. In fact, IHA uses this website for its performance reporting.
In addition, many individual plans also report quality results. The State of Minnesota
provides a convenient website that contains links to several plans and provider organizations
that report quality data. Minnesota Health Information, http://www.minnesotahealthinfo.org/
compare/physicians.html. The Leapfrog website publishes results of its hospital quality and
safety survey. Welcome to the Leapfrog Group Hospital Quality and Safety Results,
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/cp.
Programs,
http://www.ncqa.org/
330. NCQA
Physician
Recognition
PhysicianQualityReports.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
331. FED. R. EvID. 404.
332. See, e.g., Blevins v. Clark, 740 N.E.2d 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing nurse
to testify about doctor's reputation in error); McGarry v. Horlacher, 775 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2002) (excluding evidence of defendant's personal state of affairs, including
relationship with surgical assistant and criminal threats made by defendant's wife); and
Schroeder v. Jacquiss, 2001 WL 1842493 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 861 A.2d 885 (Pa. 2004) (disallowing defendant's expert testimony
regarding defendant's level of competency as a surgeon).
333. 784 So.2d 197, 203 (Miss. 1997).
334. Id. at 204.
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McCaffrey quoted the reasoning set forth in a similar decision by the North
Carolina Supreme Court:
[t]he character of a defendant physician in a medical malpractice action is
irrelevant to the ultimate issue of whether the physician acted negligently.
Such evidence tempts the jury to base its decision on emotion and to
reward good people or punish bad33people, rather than to render a verdict
based upon the facts before them. P
The Liberatore case also dealt with evidence very similar to a provider's
performance rating. In Liberatore, the Florida Court of Appeals ruled that
it was reversible error to allow the defendant to testify that he was included
on the list of "top doctors" in a local survey.3 36
Detailed performance history may be addressed by Rule 404(b), which
prohibits evidence of prior acts to prove character in order to show
conformity therewith.3 37 The rule does allow admission if the evidence is
admissible for other purposes, such as to show proof of plan, motive,
knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident.338 For both sections of Rule
404, the key to admissibility is whether the evidence is offered to show the
character of the defendant. Miller ex rel. Miller v. Phillips provides a good
example of how prior acts or conduct can be successfully distinguished
from character evidence. 339 In Phillips, the plaintiff sued a midwife,
alleging that when the defendant became aware of fetal distress and
shoulder dystocia during the delivery, the defendant panicked and
mishandled the baby. 340 The plaintiff presented witnesses who testified that
the defendant panicked. 34' The plaintiff also called the defendant during its
case-in-chief and questioned her about her reactions during previous
deliveries. The defendant denied panicking. 342 The defendant then asked
the court's permission to offer evidence that she had not panicked during
previous deliveries.343 The trial court allowed the testimony, ruling that the
plaintiff had opened the door to the issue.344

335.
336.

Id.
Liberatore v. Kaufman, 835 So.2d 404, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).

337.

FED. R. EvID. 404(b).

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
959 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Ala. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1249-50.
Id. at 1251.
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On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly admitted
evidence of the defendant's character. 345 However, the Alaska Supreme
Court ruled that the evidence was properly admitted.346 The court explained
that because of the plaintiffs theory in the case, the evidence related more
to the defendant's knowledge and experience than to character evidence.3 47
The court noted that the plaintiffs counsel extensively questioned the
defendant about her knowledge and experience in handling these
deliveries.348 In fact, the plaintiffs counsel's line of questioning suggested
that the defendant was not aware of the proper method for handling
shoulder dystocia prior to the delivery in question. 349 The court ruled that
because the plaintiff called into question the defendant's knowledge,
experience, and ability to deal with these deliveries, the defendant could
present witnesses with knowledge of her capability of handling such
deliveries.3 50
The court further explained that evidence of the defendant's knowledge,
experience, and capability should not be considered as character
evidence.35' Yet the court acknowledged that some of the testimony was
more like character evidence because it dealt with her emotional
response.35 2 The court noted that in this particular case, as the evidence was
so closely tied to evidence of the defendant's experience and knowledge, it
created little likelihood that the jury would treat it as character evidence.353
Additionally, the court stated that even if the jury considered the evidence
as character evidence, admission was justified because the plaintiff's
counsel "all but invited this testimony"' 3 when
he asked the following
4
deliveries?
all
on
panic
you
"Do
question:
When a patient brings suit against a health plan or MCO for negligent
credentialing, the admissibility of a provider's performance history tends to
be much less complicated. A plaintiff should not have any difficulty
demonstrating that the provider's performance results are relevant to a
claim against an MCO for negligent credentialing. However, the difficulty
will arise in cases where the provider and the MCO are both named as
defendants and tried in the same case.
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Overall, P4P performance ratings are not generally admissible in
malpractice cases against individual providers. Specific performance
information may be admissible if the moving party can make a compelling
argument that the information is not offered as character evidence but is
relevant for some other reason.
V. CONCLUSION

The success and future of P4P remains to be seen. The magnitude of
P4P's effects depends on its pervasiveness and endurance. No long-term
studies have been conducted to predict the future of P4P programs.
However, providers should be prepared for expansion of P4P programs
because they are already a reality. Major healthcare payors, such as large
employers and Medicare, continue to pursue P4P seriously and may pursue
implementation in the near future.
While providers may initially focus on the economic aspects of P4P, they
should also be aware of P4P's other implications. Providers should be
cognizant that P4P may affect certain aspects of their relationship with
health plans and MCOs because of the likelihood of increased liability
Additionally, providers who
exposure for credentialing decisions.
participate in P4P programs should insist upon contractual terms that allow
fair review of performance scores and that grant hearing rights for
termination decisions.
In malpractice cases, parties can anticipate more discovery disputes
because P4P programs aim to collect and analyze a broad range of
information regarding the practice of providers. The good news for
providers, though, is that P4P may offer a cogent argument for the
Such a privilege could
application of the peer review privilege.
significantly limit and shorten the discovery process. Providers and their
counsel should take an active role to ensure that P4P programs issue
guidelines and review and analyze performance data within the structure of
the peer review statutes.
Courts will continue to struggle with the admissibility of clinical
guidelines. The crucial factors for admissibility include both the nature and
purpose of the clinical guideline as well as the particular approach chosen
by the party seeking to admit the guideline. On one hand, P4P will add to
the struggle by increasing consumer familiarity with guidelines. On the
other, P4P may limit the admissibility of guidelines. Courts may be
persuaded that P4P guidelines are meant to reduce costs and not to establish
the standard of care. Finally, while P4P ratings may help providers
advertise services, it is unlikely that they will be allowed in the courtroom
as part of a defense in a malpractice case.
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Overall, many of the potentially detrimental effects of P4P can be
minimized by foresight and provider involvement. Provider liability will
mainly be affected by the creation of additional practice history data and the
fact that this data will be more widely known and available. Currently, it is
unclear whether P4P will evolve into a common set of programs or whether
payors will create more individualized incentive programs. The more
homogenous the programs, the more accessible the information will be to
consumers and litigants.
The influences that P4P may have on liability should be weighed against
other considerations for providers, such as the overall costs and benefits of
the program. As one physician noted, even though performance evaluation
may have its drawbacks, the overall approach of focusing on preventative
care and using standardized practices to contain costs may be much more
appealing than the previous managed care approach of limiting patient
care. 355 As long as providers remain involved in the development of P4P
programs, they can continue to shape the development of P4P programs to
protect their interests.
Although many issues remain, the fact that P4P programs have
developed demonstrates that we as a society have changed our view of the
quality and value of medical services. Even if incentive programs similar to
P4P cease to exist, it is unlikely that we will ever completely abandon the
association of provider performance and payment. The focus on provider
performance will no doubt continue to make its way into the courtroom in
one form or another.

355. James H. Thrall, M.D., The Emerging Role of Pay-for-PerformanceContracting
for Health Care Services, 233 Radiology 637, 640 (2004), available at
http://radiology.rsnajnls.org/cgi/content/full/233/3/637?eaf.
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